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This thesis explores the process of major systems
acquisition in Britain and the United States. It
describes the process of initiation and development of
systems from the management view-point, and also the
methods used by each government for control of the project
and the contractor. The differences between the systems
of the two countries are highlighted.
Many differences are described, some of which are
attributable to the geographic size or the resources of
each country. Others are attributable to the fact that
there are more than one way of operating efficiently,
and finally, it is concluded that there are differences
in which one country would benefit by heeding the
practices of the other.
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I. rNTRODUCTIQN
The object of this thesis is to present some comparisons
of system acquisition management, or procurement management
as it is known in Britain, between the Royal Navy and the
United States Navy. As the subject covers a wide spectrum,
only certain aspects are presented. One is how an acquisition
is initiated and the path it takes through the various phases
of the acquisition process. The other is the methods used to
control a project from the perspective of the project
manager. A further limitation is that only the acquisition
of major systems is considered. These are systems which are
expected to cost more than certain values or are considered
particularly significant by the respective governments. At
present the financial thresholds for a system to be considered
major are:
Research & Development Production
Britain 5 M 10 M
United States 75 M 300 M
In order to provide practical examples the acquisition
process of two missiles is described. For the Royal Navy,
the acquisition of the Sea wo If missile system is described
and for the United States Navy, the Standard Missile 2.
In writing this thesis eyery effort has been made to keep
the terminology general so that it may be readily understood
in Britain and the United States. Particular terminology or

titles are identified by (UK) or (.US) where necessary,
although in normal use they would be omitted. The term
'defence agency' is used as the common name for the Ministry
of Defence (.UK) and Department of Defense (.US). Also, the
term 'project' is used throughout with no differentiation
between a 'project' and a 'programme' suggested. Finally
this thesis is written in accordance with the Oxford English
Dictionary except where proper names or titles of the United
States are used.
A. REASONS FOR THE THESIS
On April 5, 1976 the Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-109 (US) (Ref. 1) was issued for use by all United
States Executive agencies* and was subsequently implemented
by the U.S. Department of Defense Directives 5000.1 and
5000.2 (US) (Ref. 2 and 3) on January 18, 1977. As a part of
these documents, significant changes were made to how a
project is initiated and to how it is monitored during its
early stages. There is still some doubt in the eyes of the
United States authorities as to how these directives should
be carried out and whether the principles are correct. These
aspects are being studied at present as a separate thesis. (Ref 4)
An Executive agency is a major U.S. Government operating
agency reporting to the President. Examples are the
Departments of Defense; Treasury; Health, Education and
Welfare; and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency.
10

To provide a comparison, one of the objects of this
thesis is to highlight the differences between the United
States and British, methods, of initiating an acquisition
project. This is so that the United States authorities may
understand why the British follow a particular path and so
that the British authorities may consider if there are lessons
to be learnt from the recent changes within the United States.
Another objective of this thesis, in addition to the above
which concerns the central administrations of the respective
defence agencies, is to study how acquisition projects are
managed by project offices of each country. This is because
there are significant differences between the relationship of
the government, which includes the project office, and
industry in the United States and in Britain. The reasons
for these differences are explained so that a better under-
standing may be obtained and any worthwhile changes may become
apparent .
For the last seven years, project administration in
Britain has been influenced by the 'Downey Report' (Ref. 5)
and it is only now that results of this method of management
are being realised. Therefore, this thesis presents some of
the outstanding problems and also highlights some of the
differences of opinions that still exist within Britain as
to its implementation. The method described in the 'Downey
Report' (.Ref. 5) will be compared with the existing United
States method so that the advantages of each can be presented.
11

Finally, a better understanding of how and why the other
half operates can only he beneficial, especially when it comes
to arms sales or cooperative ventures. Therefore in the
course of this thesis some of the aspects of system acquisi-
tion in each country are described for informative purposes.
B. THE METHOD OF RESEARCH
In this thesis, the aspects of the acquisition process
and the project control are broken down into how it logically
should happen, how the regulations intend it to happen and
how it happens in practice. These are called the normative,
prescriptive and descriptive methods respectively. To satisfy
the normative and prescriptive methods, part of the research
for this thesis was to study many of the publications that
are relevant to systems acquisition.
In order to research the descriptive method, the acquisi-
tions of Seawolf and Standard Missile 2 were studied. An
overview of these systems is given in section IC . To gather
information, visits were made to the respective defence agency
project offices and contractors. In the United States, this
involved a visit to General Dynamics (Pomona), California and
to the project office in Washington. While in Washington,
the technical advisors for SM-2 were also visited at the
Applied Physics Laboratory of John Hopkins University,
Baltimore. To gather information for the Seawolf system, the
project office and other involved personnel were visited at
the Admiralty Surface Weapons Establishment, Portsdown. The
12

prime contractors, being the British. Aircraft Corporation
and Marconi Radar Systems Limited, were also yisited. A
complete list of all organisations and personnel visited are
given in the Appendix. The time spent, and cooperation
experienced, in all the interviews was very much appreciated
and there appeared to be an atmosphere of frankness in the
discussions. In return, any comments or criticisms in this
thesis by the author are intended to be constructive and not
directed at a particular individual or organisation.
C. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEMS STUDIED
1 . Seawol f /Gui ded Weapon System 25
In the above heading, Seawolf refers to the missile,
and Guided Weapon System 25 (GWS 25) refers to the shipborne
tracker and launcher system. Together, it is a close range,
command to 1 i ne-of -si gh t , point-defence anti-missile system.
Initial studies for the system were carried out from 1964,
with preliminary development starting in 1967. Full-scale
development was started in 1968 and the system is now in produc
tion. Trials were carried out in a converted frigate and
have been successfully completed. It is at present being
fitted to a new class of frigates under construction.
For the complete system there are two prime
contractors and many subcontractors. For the Seawolf missile
and missile guidance unit, the British Aircraft Corporation
(.now British Aerospace) are the prime contractors and for the
ship-borne tracker and launcher, the prime contractor is
Marconi Radar Systems Ltd.
13

2. The Standard Missi le 2
The Standard Missile 2 CSM-2) a medium to long
range, semi-active, surface-to-air family of missiles. There
are two versions, the medium range one and an extended range
one which has an additional boost motor. The SM-2 medium
range version is part of the Aegis system and can also be
used in improved Tartar systems. In the Extended Range
version it will be used in improved Terrier systems.
i Initial studies for the Aegis system were carried
out from 1964, and SM-2 was not identified until early 1970.
The main reasons for the evolution of SM-2 was that it was
decided that the Aegis system was to be developed without a
missile and that a missile would be developed separately.
General Dynamics (Pomona) proposed a modified and improved
version of the Standard Missile 1 and became the prime
contractor .
The present position is that sea trials have been
successfully completed for the improved Terrier missiles and
Aegis missiles. There is a pilot production contract underway
for Extended Range Terrier mode missiles with delivery
expected to begin in 1978.
Figure 1 shows the major events for Seawolf and






























































































































































































































II . THE SYSTEM ACQUISITION LIFE CYCLE
The system life cycle may be said to originate in the
perception of a need and to terminate when the system is
retired as obsolete. However, designing a system to just meet
the need is not usually sufficient. With few exceptions, the
system must be able to continue to meet the need over a
specified period of time in order to justify the investment in
time, money, and effort. Thus, one must consider a system
in a dynamic sense - the life cycle or so called "cradle-to-
grave" viewpoint. (Ref. 6)
In this chapter the logical or rational process, known
as the normative model, will be described. This process is
equally applicable whether acquiring a new weapon system, ship,
or commercial system. Figure 2 illustrates the overall
sequence .
A. THE INITIATION
The systems acquisition process should be initiated only
when a definite need is found to exist. Sources of need result
from new technology, intelligence (threats), and system obso-
lescence. The acquisition process is always bounded by
constraints such as technology, available resources, the environ
ment, politics and finances, and these constraints are carefully
weighed against the importance of the new need. Only when
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taken to initiate the acquisition process in order to satisfy
the new need.
B. CONCEPT FORMULATION PHASE
During this phase the needs and constraints are analyzed
and approaches are developed in order to prepare an operational
requirement in mission oriented terms (what the system should
do operationally) and in sufficient detail to facilitate a
decision to enter the subsequent phase. The requirements are
based upon a need and activity (threat and mission) analysis.
Measures of effectiveness, technical, financial and resource
feasibility, and system utility should be addressed.
A plan (acquisition strategy) should be prepared to carry
out the proposed development if it meets the above feasibility
tests .
C. SYSTEM DEFINITION PHASE
During this phase studies are carried out to translate
the operational requirements into system requirements or
"design-to" specifications (how the system should be config-
ured). Entry into this phase is based on a decision to
further develop and confirm a proposed concept. Preliminary
design is carried out, including qualitative and quantitative
performance, reliability, maintainability, and other system
requirements as well as physical specifications based on the
economic and technical feasibility of accomplishing the
programme in a stated period of time. During this phase,
18

prototype hardware for subsystems may be produced
to evaluate technological feasibility and reduce devel-
opment risk. The results of this phase provide the basis
for a major decision to continue with full-scale devel-
opment of the proposed system.
D. DEVELOPMENT PHASE
The development phase translates general system design
requirements into a detailed design of the system including
preproduction or prototype models. The model is used to
evaluate the system's ability to meet the design and
operational requirements by means of test and evaluation.
During the development of a system, engineering design
parameters such as performance, reliability, maintainability
and supportability should be integrated by a series of trade
offs to achieve the best possible combination of system
cost, schedule and capability. The results of development
and initial operational tests provide the basis for a
decision to enter the production phase, either pilot or
f ul 1 -seal e.
E. PRODUCTION PHASE
The production phase represents a major committment of
resources to procure systems in sufficient quantities to
meet the required capability. During this phase, emphasis
is shifted from engineering design to product assurance
to ensure that the production models are capable of meeting
the performance specifications. Follow-on operational test
19

and evaluation of the early production models may result
in some design improvements but, in a properly executed
design, major changes should not be expected. Logistic
support resources must be procured concurrently with the
new systems to permit their entry into the next phase.
F. OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT PHASE
During this phase the systems are utilized to fulfill
the need. Service use of the systems in the actual
operational and physical environment will permit the
evaluation of their cost-effectiveness including logistic
support planning.
G. MODIFICATION AND RETIREMENT PHASES
Operational employment may also develop the need for
modifications or improvements in the capability that are
required in order to meet the changing threat. If this is
so, the system enters the modification phase. Finally,
when the system is obsolescent and must be replaced,
iteration of the system life cycle will determine whether
a new capability is required or if further modifications






In this chapter the methods by which an acquisition is
initiated in Britain and the United States will be detailed
and the differences in the two methods explained. As might
be expected, much of the process in the two countries is the
same but there are significant variations due to the differ-
ences in the organisation of the defence agencies, the size
of industry and its relationship with its own defence agency.
In order to explain the acquisition initiation sequence a
section below is devoted to each relevant part.
A. THE USER-PRODUCER RELATIONSHIP
Before describing the documents of each country that
officially initiate the acquisition sequence, it is necessary
to briefly describe the organisations of the respective
defence agencies appertaining to this sequence. In the
heading to this section, the term 'user' refers to the
operator or customer and the term 'producer' refers to the
organisations responsible for acquisition or procurement.
It is interesting to note that both defence agencies
have made fundamental changes to their organisations within
a few years of one another and each has taken up the position
that the other one has relinquished. In the United States,
the producer organisation, under the Chief of Naval Material,
21

was in parallel with the user organisation, under the Chief
of Naval Operations, for two years. Then in 1966, it
reverted to its original position of being subservient to
it. (Ref. 12) A few years later, in Britain, the producer
organisation, under the Controller of the Navy,* was changed
from being subservient to the user organisation, under the
Chief of Naval Staff, to being in parallel with it.
(Ref. 10) The present position is shown in Figure 3 for
comparison. In Britain, while the producer is in a parallel
path to the user, when it comes to procurement matters he is
in a stronger position. This is seen by the fact that the
Vice Chief of Naval Staff is the only user on the Naval
Projects Committee which is chaired by the Controller of the
Navy. (The position of this committee is shown in Figure
7).
Although in Britain, the producer organisation has
more official influence on acquisition matters than the user,
the effect is balanced by an active user-producer dialogue
which is encouraged at a very early stage of the acquisition
process. This is shown in the following quote:
"There is no intention to interfere with the
free interchange of facts and opinions between
members of the Naval Staff and of the Weapons
Department Directorates. The importance of a
continuing dialogue between the "customer" and
the development and production authorities, in
the preparation of the first draft Target or
Requirement and at all subsequent stages is fully
recognized. (Ref. 13)
*The Controller of the Navy is the head of naval
acquisition and is not the equivalent of a "Comptroller"
































































































































































The 'Target' in the quote is the equivalent of the United
States Mission Element Need Statement (both described in
Section III B 4)
. Therefore, it can be seen that in
Britain the user-producer dialogue starts before the
acquisition is officially initiated, whereas in the United
States the Mission Element Need Statement is written by
the user and a user-producer dialogue typically starts
after it has been approved.
B. THE PRESCRIPTIVE SEQUENCE
This is the sequence laid down in the regulations and
policies of the respective defence agencies. For the Royal
Navy the principle document is the ' NAVSTARCOOE ' (Ref. 7)
and for the United States Navy the leading document is DOD
Directive 5000.1 (Ref. 2). In addition to this document,
for the United States Navy, there are many supplementary
ones which lay down in detail the process that is to be
followed and the paperwork that needs to be compiled. For
the Royal Navy, the NAVSTARCODE (Ref. 7) is written as an
informative guide, and supplementary documents with the
detailed instructions do not appear to be so readily
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1 . The Threat Assessment
The existence of a threat is normally reported to
the respective defence agencies through intelligence networks,
the organisation of which is outside the scope of this thesis.
Within the defence agencies, this threat must then be
assessed so that any necessary action to counter the threat
may be initiated. Within the United States, there is a
clearly defined flow of information from the President and
his National Security Council through the Department of
Defense to the Navy Department. A simplified diagram of this
flow is shown in Figure 5. Two yery important documents
within the Navy Department are the Chief of Naval Operations
Policy and Planning Guidance (CPPG) and the Chief of Naval
Operations Program Analysis Memorandum (CPAM). The former
describes the Navy's roles and missions and furnishes broad
Navy planning guidance, a section of it presents CNO's views
on the military threat. The latter document provides in-depth
analysis of each major mission area and the alternatives on
how to accomplish the goals of the CPPG (Ref. 8).
Within the British Ministry of Defence there does not
appear to be such a long and detailed flow of information.
The overall assessment of the threat in relation to defence
policy is debated by the Operational Requirements Committee
(ORC) which is chaired by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff
(Operational Requirements). From this committee, broad
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Committee where the detailed composition and characteristics
of the fleet are planned.
At this high-level of.planning, it can be said that
there is a very much more formal system of dissemination of
plans and information in the United States than in Britain.
In the British Ministry of Defence this function is carried
out by more informal policy papers.
In the case of Seawolf, the acquisition was
initiated as a result of intelligence as to the expected threat
from the late 1970's onwards, and of defence policy which laid
down the area of operation and type of ship that it was to be
fitted in. Since then a threat of improved electronic counter-
measures has been realised, as a result of which an improvement
programme has been initiated.
For the SM-2, the initiation is slightly obscured as
the SM-2 missile first appeared in a requirement for a more
encompassing system, the Aegis system. This latter system was
initiated as a result of the Worthington Committee Report in
1965 (Ref. 9) which realised the projected threat through the
time frame 1975-1995 of the increased stand-off range of
launch platforms with increased ECM capabilities and improved
missile and aircraft performance. In a similar manner to the
Seawolf improvement programme, an improvement programme for
the SM-2 system has been initiated due to the Russian Backfire
bomber with Anti-Ship Missile threat being identified as the






As a general statement it can be said that in
Bri tain, i ndus try is used to a greater extent than in the
United States for carrying out defence oriented research. The
Rayner Report of 1971 (Ref. 10) emphasizes this by stating:
"The bias in changing the existing situation
should, therefore, be firmly towards reducing the
totality of intra-mural research and development
effort and increasing that in manufacturers."
This process is still continuing. Within the United States
there is now a move towards giving industry more research as
stated in DOD Directive 5000.1 of January 1977 (Ref. 2):
"This technology base shall be maintained by the
DOD Components and performed by industry, universities
and Government in-house organisations with the major
emphasis on industry and universities."
This move is not without controversy as the Government
laboratories see themselves being displaced.
Within the British Ministry of Defence there are
Defence Research Programmes which can be defined as effort
directed towards increasing scientific and engineering
knowledge. Each programme (there are a total of three) is
broken down into a Naval Research Objective-General and a
Naval Research Object-Aimed. The former is for research on
a broad front and is generally carried out and paid for by
industry. The latter is paid for by the Ministry of Defence
and is carried out either by industry or within the Ministry of
Defence. All the programmes are reviewed annually by the Defence
Research Committee which is a central staff committee designed to
link the Secretary of the State for Defence and Chiefs of Staff
29

with the defence research community. From discussions with
two contractors whose majority of work is defence oriented,
one stated that approximately 50% of R&D was funded by the
company and the other stated that nearly all was.
Within the United States Department of the Navy,
the main document is the Science and Technology Objectives
(S&TO)
. it is controlled by the Director, Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation (DRDT&E) who is within the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations and it describes the Navy's
problems requiring R&D solutions and also highlights the
anticipated threat. As such it does not appear to control
how and where R&D funds are spent. If more funds are spent on
R&D in industry it is quite likely that these activities will
be more closely controlled as they come more under the public
eye
.
3. Pre-Feasibi 1 i ty Studies (UK) and Technology Base (US)
These may be considered as areas of naval research
which are more closely defined and are associated with a
particular concept or need.
Within the United States there is a laid down
sequence as described in NAVMATINST 5000. 22A (Ref. 11) and
illustrated in Figure 6. In response to Science and Technology
Objectives, an Exploratory Development Program is developed
which will be based on a set of dynamic technical strategies
designed to: (1) take maximum advantage of new technical
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RESEARCH AND EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT SEQUENCE
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capabilities; and (3) provide prompt response to perceived
requirements for superior naval capability. (Ref. 11)
As results of this programme, papers on Advanced
System Concepts are written and compiled into Nayal Advanced
Concepts (NAC). This NAC is then presented to the Chief of
Naval Operations annually as a compendium of concepts recom-
mended for further development as required.
Within Britain the process is so defined that pre-
feasibility studies are generally only carried out for a
specific purpose. They may be either intramural or with
industry and if with the latter, would be paid for by the
Ministry of Defence. The initiation of the Seawolf project
was unusual as the R&D establishment responsible for it went
to industry with certain ideas and asked if these were
possi bl e .
4
. The Naval Staff Target (UK) and Mission Element-
Need Statement (US)
Approval of the above documents signifies the
initiation of a project, the former is British and the latter
of the United States. Both documents are initiated by the
user organisations and after comments and amendments by other
organisations are presented to a central authority for approval
The main sequence of events is shown in Figures 7 and 8. The
main differences are that in the British system a user-
producer dialogue and participation by industry (Ref. 14) is
started during the drafting of the NST, whereas in the United
States system it is not. The other main difference is that
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Secretary of Defence whereas in the British system approval
is given by a central staff committee. It is interesting
to note that in Britain more emphasis is given to decisions
and approval by committee whereas in America it is more by
a named individual, though obviously backed by advisors.
In both the NST and MENS the need for the proposed
system is required to be clearly stated and is to be
expressed in terms of mission purpose, capability, etc. and
not in terms of equipments (Ref. 3 and 7). The requirement
to have a MENS approved has only been in existence since
January 1977 when DOD Directive 5000.1 was issued. (Ref. 2)
One of its main objectives is to ensure that there is a
clear need before any work is started and it is interesting
to note that the Advanced Naval Gun System which started
with no well defined mission need and expressed in equipment
terms, i.e., a gun, had little support for the six years of
its life. It was eventually cancelled by Congress.
As a final point, in Britain NST's may be proposed
by a producer as well as a user and it appears that the
producer is more inclined to propose an offensive system
while the user proposes more defensive ones. This can be
seen by the fact that the user is more aware of the threat
to him while the producer is more aware of advances in




C. ADDITIONAL FACTORS DUE TO NATO CONSIDERATIONS
1 . The Organisation
There are many ways in which several nations can
become involved in acquiring weapons from another nation.
It can be by purchase, co-production or co-development.
For co-development projects, the basic organisation and
flow of information are given in Figure 9. In order to
complete the picture of aspects due to NATO, some of the
problems of purchase or co-production are presented in this
section.
For the NATO countries which have their own arms
industries but which cannot afford to develop all their own
equipment, co-development is the best option. This group
of countries includes Britain, West Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands but not the United States as it is big enough
to develop all its own equipment. The advantages of
co-development are: decreased unit costs due to large
production runs; sharing of development costs; standard-
isation and simplified logistics within NATO; and the
dissemination of technical expertise among the countries.
For the United States though, these advantages are not
appreciable and the dissemination of technical expertise is
a significant disadvantage to it. Therefore it is not
surprising that very much more emphasis is given to co-
development projects in Britain and the others of her group






























by the author that the United States should not ignore
co-development projects. This is because if the wealthy
middle eastern countries turn from purchasing to co-
development, they may well come to countries that are
experienced in it rather than the United States. If this
were to happen the defence industry of the United States
would have difficulty in satisfying its capacity.
2 . The Problems
The problem of co-development is that with many
countries and more levels of committees and reports, delays
are inevitable and it has been estimated that it takes an
extra two years to reach a production state. There is also
the problem of national pride as to which country will be
the leader. Often the compromise is for there to be a
joint leadership with its attendant committees, delays and
costs. The other main problems are the language and
technical conventions. Even between Britain and the United
States there are these problems, as experienced on the
Harrier and Harpoon projects for example. Therefore between
countries of differing languages these problems could be
extreme .
If NATO countries become involved in co-production
or purchase projects there are problems of balance of
payments and support of their own industries. Each country
will attempt to support its own industries despite the law
being unwritten, but in the United States it is clearly
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written that there must be at least a 6% price advantage
by buying abroad, or that a similar item cannot be obtained
within the United States. (Ref. 15). However, a change of
thinking by the United States on this restriction is apparent
D. OTHER INPUTS CAUSING INITIATION
In order to include all the inputs that can cause the
acquisition to be initiated it is necessary to devote this
last section to those inputs that do not follow the
prescriptive process.
Within Britain, industry has an input which makes a
significant impact on what is acquired. It is \/ery difficult
to find out how many suggestions or ideas industry presents
to the Ministry of Defence as all companies vary in this
respect but, as an example, the Guided Weapons Division of
British Aircraft Corporation (now British Aerospace) estimate
that they make three times as many suggestions to the
Ministry of Defence to ewery one Ministry generated idea.
A reason that industry generates its own ideas is connected
with foreign sales. When a company considers it can develop
a weapon system with foreign sales potential, it is normally
only financially feasible if much of the development is
paid for by the Ministry of Defence. Therefore it is
necessary to present the concept to the Ministry and to
negotiate a compromise that will fulfill the needs of the
Ministry of Defence and be attractive for foreign sales.
As an example, at the present time, the British Aircraft
Corporation is suggesting the need for a simplified, light-
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weight version of Seawolf. For the Royal Navy it would
mean that it could be fitted on more ships and, more
important to BAC, it would have good foreign sales potential
In this chapter the processes by which the Naval Staff
Targets (UK) and Mission Element Need Statements (US) are
initiated and approved have been discussed. Their approval
officially initiates the acquisition phases which are the
subject of the following chapter.
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IV. THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT PHASES
In this chapter, the sequence between the official
initiation, which was described in the last chapter,
and the decision to enter the production phase is
described. Within the planning and development phases,
the process of: design; evaluation; and decision making
are carried out several times. At each iteration as the
process progresses, the risk of failure decreases but at
the same time the cost of failure increases. Therefore
decisions taken to continue the project after it has been
in existence for some time must still be rational ones
and not treated as the rubber-stamping of a process that
cannot be stopped.
In the sections below, the prescriptive sequence will
be described with the greatest detail being applied to the
earlier phases. Later on in this chapter the differences
between contractual practices are presented for comparison.
Finally, the problems of ensuring continuity of the project
due to fluctuations of the funds available will be high-
1 i g h t e d .
A. THE PRESCRIPTIVE SEQUENCE
Within the Royal Navy and the United States Navy a sequence
is laid down in similar documents as for the acquisition
initiation. Therefore the comments in Section III B
apply equally here. Figure 10 shows the basic
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the same although with different titles and the fact that in
Britain the validation phase is carried out in two parts.
As a general statement about the proportion of effort
that should be applied to each stage of development, the
Rayner Report (Ref. 10) recommends:
'that 15% of forecast development expenditure
is incurred before the decision is taken to go to
ful 1 devel opment .
'
The Rayner Report (Ref. 10) also states that the proportion
spent before full development:
'still falls well short in most cases of the
recommended proportions. Evidence here, and in
the United States, points to this as a major
defect of current practice in both countries. 1
1 . The Project Team
In both Britain and the United States it is clearly
laid down that a Project Manager must be appoi nted, and the
nucleus of a team formed, as soon as the project has been
officially initiated (Ref. 5 and 2). In both defence agencies
there is concern about the high turn-over of project staff
and in Britain the Downey Report especially recommended that:
in particular, the length of the tours of duty
of senior officers in key posts should be extended
(Ref. 5).
Within the United States Department of Defense it is laid
down that:
A change in program managers shall not be made
prior to Milestone I or during full-scale engineering
development prior to the Milestone III decision,
except by specific action of the Component Head or
his designee. (Ref. 2)
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In other words, once a project manager is appointed he should
only change during the validation or production phases.
As guidance to the project manager, in the United
States there is the Department of the Navy Programming
Manual (Ref. 16) and in Britain for the Royal Navy there will
be the Guidance Handbook for Project Management (Ref. 17)
(at present only in draft form). The former is a yery compre-
hensive book that details much of the Planning, Programming
and Budgeting System ( PPBS ) of the United States as well as
the overall acquisition system. It does not go into the
details of the day to day running of a project. On the other
hand, the British Guidance Handbook concentrates on the
running of the project to the exclusion of much of the detail
of overall planning and budgeting.
2. Feasibility Studies (UK) and Conceptual Phase (US)
This phase is the process of converting the Naval
Staff Target (UK) or Mission Element Need Statement (US) into
an operational requirement based on conceptual design approaches
that are feasible.
In Britain, the NST is circulated to selected
industries, some of whom may have already been involved in
the drafting of it. Tenders are then invited for feasibility
study contracts with contracts being awarded to a few
companies. The number of contracts awarded depends on the
size and complexity of the future development programme and
on the response from the companies approached. To whom the
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contracts are awarded is decided by the project team and
contracts department. This decision is based on technical
and financial competence and the capability of the contractor
to undertake the whole development and production programme.
It is not necessarily based on the lowest bidders. As an
example, with the Seawolf missile, feasibility study contracts
were awarded to three contractors, one of which was the British
Aircraft Corporation. The output of the study is a report by
the contractor giving a technical appraisal of the viable
solution to meet the NST requirements, together with prelimi-
nary estimates of development and production costs and
time scales for the preferred solution. This report is used
as the basis for discussions between the user and the
producer which lead to the drafting of the Naval Staff
Requirement, which is discussed in the next section.
At present, within the United States, the sequence
of events and documents is under review. This has been caused
by the recent introduction of the Mission Element Need Statement
at the beginning of the process. The MENS was introduced by the
Department of Defense in DOD Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2
(Ref. 2 and 3) but as yet the Department of the Navy has not
modified the instructions that were extant prior to this.
Therefore, at present if all the directives are adhered to,
there are too many documents at the beginning of the conceptual
phase without enough analyses or technical studies. The
situation is displayed in Figure 11 with the MENS (shown
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Simplification of this phase is required and one
proposal (Ref. 18) is as shown in Figure 12. In this, concept-
ual studies would be carried out immediately after approval
of the MENS and before the Operational Requirements are
written. The other main change is that the Navy Decision
Coordinating Paper (NDCP) would become the source document to
the Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP). When compared to the
British sequence during this phase, both the present and
proposed United States ones have an additional iteration of
decision making. This is for the formulation and approval of
the acquisition strategy.
3 . Naval Staff Requirement (UK) and Decision
Coordinating Paper (US)
These two documents, the former of the Royal Navy
and the latter of the United States Navy, are the prime sources
of information for decisions on the respective projects and as
such require to be approved for continuation of the project.
For the Royal Navy, the Naval Staff Requirement (NSR) is approved
before the Project Definition phase begins and thereafter forms
the requirement specification, termed "Agreed Characteristics",
which cannot be altered except by deliberate approval. For
the United States Navy, the Decision Coordinating Paper is up-
dated at the beginning of e^/ery phase of the project to reflect
the increasing detail of the specifications as the design be-
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Figures 13 and 14 show the sequence of drafting and
approval for each navy. The Naval Staff Requirement paper
with the accompanying technical submission is what is formally
considered by the various committees, and the Project Manager is
only called upon sometimes to answer questions or elaborate
on certain topics. For a project in the United States Navy,
presentations are required to which great importance is
attached. These are given to the System Acquisition Review
Councils of the Navy and then of the Department of Defense.
The performance by the project team at these presentations is
significant to the successful continuation of the project.
In the United States, final approval comes from the Secretary
of Defense, whereas in Britain the Minister is not involved
at this stage, delegating the final approval to the Defence
Equipment Policy Committee. It could be considered that the
final act of approval by the United States Secretary of Defense
is to endorse the recommendation of the DSARC. However, it is
interesting to note that in the case of Aegis with SM-2, the
Secretary of Defense selected and approved a different option
to that recommended by the DSARC.
The Defense System Acquisition Review Council
(DSARC) has the responsibility of considering all aspects for
continuation of the project. These include that there is
still a valid need; the technical assessment and remaining
risks; the resources available, both material and financial;
the available alternatives; and the overall acquisition
strategy (Ref. 3). Within Britain this responsibility is
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divided between the Operational Requirements Committee (ORC)
and the Defence Equipment Policy Committee (DEPC) as defined
in their 'terms of reference' (areas of responsibility):
ORC
To keep under review the pattern of long term military
equipment and weapon requirements, against the
background of current Defence policy and longer-term
studies in order to make the most effective use of
the likely available resources.
DEPC
To advise what major projects should be included in
the development programme to meet operational
requirements endorsed by the ORC, taking into
account of defence budget resources and consideration
of national industrial defence potential, collaboration
and foreign purchase.
Having been approved by the respective committees,
a project cannot continue with the placing of contracts until
funds have been released to it. In Britain, this is effected
by a request or 'submission' to the Treasury which normally
then releases the full amount requested. In the United
States, the release of funds can be affected by the opinions
of Congress as a whole in the annual Defense Authorization
Bill and by the House and Senate Appropriation Committees in
particular. In Britain, this oversight by government is carried
out by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Expenditure -
Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee which investigates
defence matters on a selective basis. In the case of Seawolf,




4. Project Definition (UK) and Validation Phase (US)
This is the phase in which, through extensive analysis
and hardware development, the major programme characteris-
tics are determined between the project office and the
contractor( s ) . Detailed estimates of the development cost
and of the development plan are also outputs of this phase.
As shown in Figure 10, there is a major difference
between Britain and the United States in this phase, as in
Britain it is split into two phases called Project Definition
1 and 2 (PD1 and PD2). By the end of PD1 , there should be
a coarse plan of the work required for full-scale development
with an accompanying PERT/TIME network and cost estimates of
each task. There should also be an initial estimate of
unit production costs. By the end of PD2, there should be
the detailed plans, estimates and specifications for full-
scale developments. Between PD1 and PD2 the normal process
of approval is still carried out although work on PD2 is
not delayed pending the approval. During an interview with
the Project Manager who was responsible for the Seawolf
missile development and who is a proponent of the recommenda-
tions of the Downey Report (Ref. 5), he stated that in his
opinion, approval at a lower level between PD1 and PD2 would
be sufficient. As stated at the beginning of this Chapter,
15% of the total development funds should be spent during
the Project Definition phase and in Britain this should be
divided as 5% during PD1 and the remaining 10% during PD2.
The splitting of the Project Definition phase was a
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recommendation of the Downey Report (Ref. 5). Prior to
that Full-Scale Development was started at a stage equating
to the start of PD2. Therefore, for the Seawolf system,
which started development before the Downey Report (Ref. 5)
was published, Full-Scale Development started after only
6% of the development funds had been spent. At that time
a comprehensive development plan had not been drawn up and
it was another 6 to 9 months before Work Package details
were finalized (Ref. 19).
By the end of the Project Definition or Validation
Phase, the detailed performance specifications should be
finalised and there should be a cost and schedule plan. In
Britain the cost and schedule are presented in the
Development Cost Plan (DCP)* which is fully described in
the 'Downey Handbook of Procedures' (Ref. 20). This document
is the responsibility of the contractor, but in practice
is produced from many discussions with the Project Team on
cost and schedule trade-offs. Also in Britain, as in the
United States, the contractor is invited to propose draft
incentives of a contract for the next stage of development.
This proposal, the DCP and a performance specification then
form the major parts of the bid for the Full-Scale Devel-
opment contract.




5 . Full-Scale Development
Before Full-Scale Development can start the process
of gaining approval must be completed again. In the United
States the Decision Coordinating Paper is updated and sub-
mitted along with a presentation to the NSARC and DSARC.
Finally the Secretary of Defense approves the start of Fu 11-
Scale Development. This process follows ^ery much the same
pattern described in Section IV A 3.
In Britain, a similar process is followed as in
Section IV A 3 and to the previous paragraph, except that the
Naval Staff Requirement is only amended if specifications
cannot be met. Therefore, the main input for approval is
the 'submission' from the Project Office. In addition to
the sequence of approval in Section IV A 3, for Full-Scale
Development the approval of the Minister of State for
Defence must be obtained.
B. CONTRACTUAL ASPECTS
Here there is a fundamental difference between the
United States and Britain. In Britain contracting is
carried out under English common law while in the United
States there are special laws contained in the Armed
Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) (Ref. 21). These
regulations were introduced in 1947 and have been con-
tinually changing and becoming more complex ever since.
Contractors who deal with the Department of Defense are
expected to know these regulations and to conform to them.
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explain
the many differences between the laws applicable to
military contracts in the respective countries but a
few of the more relevant ones to a project are described
below. Although a contract is normally a bilateral
agreement, when the Department of Defense is one of the
parties certain decisions may be taken unilaterally by
the Contracting Officer. One of these concerns a Change
Order which the Contracting Officer may force upon a
contractor. This means that the contractor is obliged
to carry out the order without delay, with an equitable
adjustment to the contract price being made later on.
In a similar manner a Contracting Officer may instruct
a contractor to speed up his schedule. If there are
disputes over the terms or costs of the contract and
agreement cannot be reached between the contractor and
the Contracting Officer, the latter makes the final decision
which is binding unless the contractor appeals through
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or the Federal
courts .
The Contracting Officer referred to in the paragraph
above is responsible to the Project Manager and is the only
officer authorised by law to make or amend contracts within
a project. This is different from Britain, where the
Project Manager himself has this authority. In the United
States, members of a project team are very carefully
instructed not to order a contractor to do additional work
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or to in any way imply that they have the authority to do
so. When dealing with any contractors, team members often
are required to show them a card, called 'The Green Card'
with the following statement on:
Statement of Limitation of Authority
You are hereby notified that I do not have the authority
to direct you in any way to alter your obligations or change
the statement of work in any contract.
Further, if the Navy, as a result of the information
obtained from today's discussion, does desire to alter your
contract obligations or to change the contract statement of
work, changes will be issued in writing and signed by the
contracting officer. You should take no action on any change
unless and until you receive such a change order.
Competition between firms is wery much stronger in the
United States than in Britain. In many cases in Britain,
this is because there may be only a \/ery few companies that
are specialised in a particular field, and that for some of
them, their resources may already be fully extended. Within
the United States, competition is actively encouraged and
0MB Circular A-109 (Ref. 1) has again stressed the point by
stating that competition should continue within a project
for as long as is economically possible and definitely
through the Validation Phase. 0MB Circular A-109 (Ref. 1)
also states that if a project team wishes to limit the
system design to a single contractor, prior approval must be
obtained from the Secretary of Defence with the basis of
the decision reported to the Congressional Authorisation
and Appropriations Committees.
In the case of SM-2 the selection of General Dynamics
as the development contractor was by an unusual process.
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Before SM-2 was separately identified, the Aegis system
had passed through the Validation Phase with competition
between Raytheon, RCA, General Dynamics and Boeing. When
the development contract was placed for Aegis, it was
awarded to RCA, but the missile was excluded from the
contract. Soon afterwards, General Dynamics made an
unsolicited proposal of a missile which was based on a
modified SM-1 missile. This was accepted by the Navy and
therefore General Dynamics won the development contract
for the missile without competition. For the Seawolf
missile, there was some competition but this was limited
to the Feasibility Studies by the British Aircraft
Corporation, Short Brothers and a group comprising of
Hawker Sidley Dynamics, General Electric Co. and Sperry
Gyroscope. Project Definition was awarded to the British
Aircraft Corporation and development was split initially
between eight specialized contractors. One of these
contractors was the British Aircraft Corporation which
was responsible for the main airframe and, therefore, for
the compatibility of the subsystems. However, the other
contractors were not subcontractors to BAC as their contracts
were directly with the Ministry of Defence.
The situation for Seawolf described in the above para-
graph continued for two years, at which point it was
decided to implement the new policy of giving the total
package to one contractor. In this package the British
Aircraft Corporation, as prime contractor, was responsible
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for design, development and production of 100 missiles, all
other contractors being subcontractors to the prime. Also
included in this package was a Target Cost Incentive clause,
which was being used for the first time.
When there is a lack of competition, as in Britain,
where one buyer, the government, is dealing with one or a
few sellers, it is difficult to establish a market price
with a reasonable profit margin. Therefore in Britain,
the Ministry of Defence has negotiated with the Confederation
of British Industry formulae for the calculation of profits
on defence contracts. Called the '1975 profit formulae,'
there is one for risk contracts and one for non-risk. The
detai Is are:
Risk: 10.8% on capital employed + 5.4% on costs
Non-risk: 9.9% on capital employed + 0.7% on costs + 0-4%
as efficiency award.
The general principle is that an average contractor should
earn 18% profit per year on capital employed. For the
Seawolf missile the Target Cost Incentive varies between 1.1
times the risk rate of profit to the basic non-risk rate of
profit. In an interview with the man responsible for the
Seawolf missile contract, he stated that incentives for
schedule and performance were not employed. This was be-
cause they would have been \/ery difficult to negotiate
originally and would be time-consuming to renegotiate for
every contract change. In other words the costs involved
would have far outweighed the savings.
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In the United States, where the defence industry is
very much larger and where there is a choice of potential
contractors, competition is available and negotiation for a
market price is generally possible. Therefore, it is not
necessary for there to be an overall agreement between
government and industry as there is in Britain. Also much
more emphasis is placed on incentives in contracts. These
contracts may be either Cost Plus Incentive Fee or Cost Plus
Award Fee and in both cases cost, schedule and performance
form criteria for the incentive. In the case of the SM-2
missile the contract is a Cost Plus Award Fee with 5% of
target costs a fixed fee and up to 10% of target costs as
an award fee. This 10% award is then split as 50% on
performance, 40% on schedule and 10% on costs.
Finally, when a contract award is announced in Britain,
the price is confidential and is only communicated to
those people who have a reason to know. In the United States,
the contract price is required by law to be published so
that all unsuccessful competitors may know the final price.
This is because it is normal to award the contract to the
lowest qualified bidder and if the contract is awarded to
a company other than the lowest one, the lower bidders have
the right to find out why they were not awarded the contract.
C. CONTINUITY OF THE PROJECT
In both Britain and the United States there are delays
due to the administrative details in approving the con-
tinuation of the project between phases. As a project
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advances through the phases, the effects of this delay
become more extreme as the project team of the contractor
employs more men. This problem is recognised in both
countries and attempts are made to speed up the approval
process as well as providing funds for the project to
continue on a temporary basis. In the United States the
most critical time is during the selection of the contractor
for Full-Scale Development. During this period approximately
three contractors may have teams working on the project and
therefore for two of them this work is probably worthless.
The Department of Defence aims to complete the Source
Selection Process within a few months but in practice the
normal time is between six months and a year. During this
time the contractors are funded to keep together a small
team for further exploratory work but the team is very
small and the progress is probably very slow.
In Britain there is a similar situation with delays
between phases of six to nine months. However, as normally
only on contractor will have carried out the Project
Definition Phase, little unnecessary work is carried out.
For a similar reason, as money will not be wasted, the
proportion of funds released between phases is greater so
that a larger team can be kept together. However, work
does slow down and as quoted in the Downey Report (Ref. 5):
As a result, these projects lost momentum and
contractors complained that tnere was a serious
deterioration of morale and that, in some cases,
key team members were lost.
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Finally when funds are provided to a contractor on an
interim basis, the contractor will not commit himself
to any capital investment or take on personnel with the




V. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DEFENCE AGENCIES AND CONTRACTORS
An interaction is any means by which organisations
influence each other; examples include cooperating, trans-
acting, conferring, collaborating and debating (Ref. 22).
Also, an interaction is an influence between two parties that
must occur in both directions. Therefore, a report is not
strictly an interaction as it is only a one way communication
However, in practice, it can be considered as an interaction
as there is normally some response to a report.
The object of this chapter is to describe the methods
of interaction between the respective defence agencies and
industries. In particular, it will highlight the differences
of interactions between the project office and the project
contractor in each country.
A. OFFICIAL INTERACTIONS
Official interactions in this context are all formal
reports and documented meetings that occur on a regular basis
The requirements for these meetings and reports are normally
laid down in the contract and they form the prime means of
communicating the progress of the project between interested
parti es
.
As a general, overall statement, it can be said that
there are yery many more reports and meetings between a
project office and contractor in Britain than there are in
the United States. The reason for this appears to be due to
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the greater physical separation of the project office from
the contractor in the United States, resulting in meetings
being more costly and time consuming. Also, in the United
States, there is frequently a 'Technical Representative' and
assisting team, who may be part of the project office, resident
at the contractor's plant. They are in very close day to day
contact with the contractor and therefore this obviates the
need for so many detailed progress reports and meetings.
In Britain, guidelines for the frequency of, and those
involved in, meetings and reports are described in the
Handbook of Procedures (Ref. 20). At the lower level it is
recommended that technical progress meetings be held every
two weeks to review the latest progress data at Element Level
and above. This meeting is primarily an internal contractors
meeting but the Ministry Project Manager is invited to attend.
However, in practice, it is normal to hold these meetings
only monthly. At the upper level it is recommended that there
be a quarterly meeting to review expenditure and technical
progress. As well as the project team from the Ministry and
the contractor attending, the senior management of both
parties also attend. In addition to these periodic meetings,
there are Configuration Control Meetings, the frequency of
which varies depending on the circumstances. These meetings
consider changes in requirements and specifications, and
design changes that affect costs.
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Regular reports are also required to be submitted by
the contractor. These would be discussed at the regular
meetings and monitored at other times by the Project Office.
A chart of the various reports and their distribution to the
Ministry of Defence is shown in Figure 15. It is considered
by the author that the volume and detail of all these reports
would preclude them from being fully read and understood.
As described in the Handbook of Procedures (Ref. 20) much of
the content of the reports is raw data and there is no method
of highlighting large variances or other problems.
If the process in Britain suffers from an over-abundance
of meetings and reports, it appears that in the United States
the reverse may be true. For nearly all major systems
acquisitions the only periodical cost and schedule report re-
quired is the Cost Performance Report. It is a monthly report
of contractual progress with identification of significant
problems obtained through analyses of variances from plans by
the contractor. Normally, it is presented at the major task
level (Figure 17). In the case of SM-2, there are no regular
progress meetings as such, detailed information about the overall
progress of the project is reported and discussed during the
evaluation of an Award Fee. Cost Plus Award Fee type contracts
are relatively new with their use increasing. In a contract of
this type, there is a fixed fee of 3r5% of target costs and an
award fee of up to approximately 10-12% of target costs.
Therefore, as the majority of the contractor's profit is in-
volved in the award, the evaluation of the state and progress of







































































































































































































































































carried out every four to six months and the decision as to
the amount is taken as a result of a meeting between Project
Officers and other senior Department of Defense officers.
Leading up to this meeting there are several reports. The
contractor produces a report which details the technical,
managerial, cost, schedule and performance achievements during
the period under consideration. It is a well produced and
readable report which presents the case for the contractor.
In addition, reports are received from Department of Defense
facilities such as test and experimental centres that have
had dealings with the project, trial ships and the Technical
Representatives at the contractor's plant. On the day of
the Award Fee Meeting, the contractor's project manager makes
a presentation and various Department of Defense officials
are interviewed. Apart from the prime reason of awarding a
fee, a thorough evaluation of the project is accomplished.
In the process, the relevant information on the project is
passed to those who need it, and overall, the process is
handled swiftly and efficiently. As an example of award
fees, those for the SM-2 development contract are shown in
Figure 16. The overall average represents about 75% of the
maximum award fee.
B. INFORMAL INTERACTIONS
Interactions that are not official are, for the purpose
of this thesis, termed informal. Most correspondence between










































































reports which are considered offici.al interactions. There
may be some informal correspondence, probably hand-written
memoranda or preliminary results of tests, but the-majority
of informal interaction would be by meetings or telephone
conversati ons
.
In Britain, the proximity of contractor to project
office makes it very easy for impromptu meetings to be called.
The majority of these meetings are called by the project
office or other branches of the Ministry of Defence and can
engage a significant proportion of a contractor's manpower.
As an example, a project manager of Marconi Radar Systems
Ltd. once stated that on his project there were over thirty
meetings with the Ministry of Defence in one month. For this
type of situation to exist, it is likely that either a contract
is ambiguous with requirements not clearly defined, or that
the project office is attempting to oversee the contractor
at too fine a detail.
In the United States, the informal interactions are less
obvious but still exist. Due to the greater distances there
is less opportunity for the impromptu meeting and it is less
frequently that the project officers visit the contractor.
In the case cf the SM-2 missile, the project manager visits
the contractor between e^/ery two weeks to two months. On the
other hand there is much informal interaction between the
resident 'Technical Represent ive' and the contractor. It is
inevitable that during the course of their daily work, the
'Technical Representative' and his team of engineers will
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discuss the progress of the project in general, and any
problems in particular. On a rather more formal basis, in
the case of SM-2, a weekly meeting is held between the
'Technical Representative' and the contractor's Project
Director. This is an informal meeting with no minutes taken
and, unless there is some particular problem or event, no
communication sent to the project office.
C. DEFENCE AGENCIES' VIEWS ON INTERACTIONS
In earlier chapters, the market conditions due to the
different sizes of the respective defence industries were
discussed. It is now necessary to present the differences
in interactions due to these different sizes. In the United
States, systems acquisition is run on ^/ery much more commer-
cial lines. By this, it is meant that the Department of
Defense is not particularly concerned with the welfare of the
contractor. The Department of Defense requires a viable
defence industry as a whole but is not concerned that an
individual contractor lost heavily on a particular contract.
On the other hand, in Britain the Ministry of Defence
is concerned about the welfare of contractors as they may
well be the only ones of their specialisation. Therefore
greater emphasis is placed on collaboration and partnership
than in the United States. As an example it is stated in a
publication on guidelines for pricing:
'that it is now necessary to encourage greater
reliance on the presumption of good faith in any
price agreement' (Ref. 23).
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Also to further the partnership it is proposed that the
Ministry of Defence employ businessmen, for relatively short
periods of time, in order to move closer to the business
communi ty . (Ref . 2 2)
.
D. INDUSTRIES' VIEWS ON INTERACTION
It appears to be the views of contractors both in the
United States and Britain that the respective project offices
become too involved in the day to day detail of the programmes.
This is despite what was described in the section on 'Official
Interactions' where it appeared that in the United States the
contractor was left more to the day to day running. In Britain
the investigation of variances at the element level are seen
by industry as normally not cost efficient. Also, despite
the atmosphere of a partnership in Britain, it is the opinion
of industry that the Ministry of Defence distrusts industry,
and as a result requires vigorous supervision of contracts.
This is resented by industry and causes extra costs and long
delays. (Ref. 22)
Another point that was highlighted in discussions with
contractors in Britain was that of the skills of the project
team members. The majority of personnel in project teams are
civil servants with technical training and therefore financial
implications are not properly considered with respect to
technical performance. With regard to Naval officers who
form the rest of the team, they are all of a technical





Finally, concerning arms exports in Britain, industry
has resented the intrusion of government into salesmanship
which it regards as so commercial as to be beyond the
competence of government. (Ref. 24) However, despite these
views, it is essential that industry and the government
maintain full cooperation in export drives, as it is normally
the military forces which demonstrate the weapon system for the




VI. PROJECT MONITORING AND CONTROL
The purpose of project monitoring and control is to
provide visibility to progress and to strive for an optimum
balance between cost, performance and schedule of an acquisi-
tion programme. The more efficient and honest that organisa-
tions are and the more closely defined the requirements,
the less would be the need for monitoring and control. However
in the real world where few things are perfect, moni tori ng and
control are necessary.
The major emphasis of this chapter will be on the
control of a contractor by the project office and will be from
the perspective of what should be required by the project
manager
.
It is often stated, both in the United States and Britain,
that: 'the contractor is paid to manage. 1 However, in truth,
it cannot be said that this is what happens in real life.
Instead a contractor runs a cost and schedule information
processing system with the majority of significant management
decisions being taken as a result of discussions with the
project office personnel. These project office personnel
carry out a check of the contractor's cost and schedule
information that they are continually provided. With this
information , and as they are in an authoritative posi ti on, they
tend to make many more of the management decisions that should
be made by the contractor.
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The proper position for a project office is to control
the prime contractors where project cost, schedule and
performance are involved and to act as the coordinator
between prime contractors and the other various defence
agency departments that affect the project.
A. THE OFFICIAL COST AND SCHEDULE GUIDELINES
In Britain, the guideline is the Handbook of Procedures-
Programming, Estimating and Control of Development Projects,
(Ref. 20) and in the United States it is DOD Instruction
7000.2 (Ref. 25). However, while the handbook is only a
guide for British projects, in the United States, compliance
with the DOD Instruction is mandatory.
1 . The Handbook of Procedures - Programming,
Estimating and Control of Development Projects
This handbook was compiled as part of the Downey
Report (Ref. 5) and provides a very detailed method of con-
trolling the work of a contractor. The scope covers:
Project Definition, Development Programming, Development Cost
Estimating, Monitoring and Controlling Technical and Cost
Progress, Unit Production Cost Estimating and the Recording
and Analysis of Data. In each of the above sections, recom-
mendations are made as to the actions of the project office;
the work required by the contractor; the reports and other
outputs required by the contractor; the proportion of funds
that should be expended; and the position the project should
attain as regards development and risk.
74

In the sections on Monitoring and Controlling
Technical and Cost Progress, a very detailed management
system is described for use by the contractor. It is a PERT
system with the major emphasis on PERT/Time. Costs are
estimated, collected and analysed but a cost schedule trade-
off analysis is not performed in accordance with PERT/Cost.
As stated above, compliance with the handbook is
not obligatory and therefore PERT does not have to be used.
However, when a contractor is making a proposal, he must come
to an agreement with the project manager as to the monitoring
system to be used. As the Project Manager will have been
trained with the PERT system, the agreed monitoring system is
unlikely to differ from it ^ery much, although it may be under
a different name.
2 . POD Instruction 7000.2 'Performance Measurement
of Selected Acquisitions '
The instructions laid down in this mandatory docu-
ment apply to all new major acquisition contracts since its
promulgation in 1972. However, this document, and any related
to it, does not lay down detailed management systems that a
contractor and project office must adhere to. Instead, it
aims at a means of control that will provide standard informa-
tion on progress at a level that can be understood. As
quoted in DOD Instruction 7000.2, there is an objective:
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"To provide an adequate basis for responsible
decision making by both contractor management and
DOD components, contractors' internal management
control systems must provide data which (1) indi-
cate work progress, (2) properly relate cost,
schedule and technical accomplishment, (3) are
valid, timely and auditable, and (4) supply DOD
managers with information at a practicable level
of summari zati on .
"
As long as a contractor's internal management system is shown
to satisfy these objectives, no change to its system is
required. It is also specifically stated that the contractor
is to provide performance data directly from the same system
used for internal management and is not to run a second
separate system for reporting to the government. In no place
in the Instruction is PERT mentioned. This is because towards
the end of the 1960's PERT became unpopular on defence con-
tracts due to the short-comings in the system being
recognised. In a major revision at the beginning of the
1970's, it was accepted that a contractor could use any method
he liked so long as it met Department of Defense approval.
Therefore, the word PERT was dropped, although to satisfy the
Department of Defense a contractor's system still has to be
yery close to a PERT system.
B. THE IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION
1 . Installing the Management System
This section describes the process necessary to
ensure that a contractor's management system is capable of
adequately monitoring progress, and of providing the required
information to the project office.
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In Britain, there is no common laid down require-
ment that contractors .rouat satisfy before being eligible for
a defence contract. Instead, during Feasibility Studies
(which -equate to the U.S. Conceptual Phase) a contractor
should include in its contract proposal, a proposed management
structure and a statement as to its willingness to meet the
requirements of monitoring and reporting (Ref. 19). Once
selected as the contractor for Project Definition (equates to
U.S. Validation Phase), it is necessary for the project
office and the contractor to come to an agreement on the
exact system to be employed. This then becomes part of the
Development Cost Plan. In the case of the Seawolf missile
contract, it was agreed tc implement the Downey proposals to
the fullest extent possible. This was the first time that
the Downey proposals had been used on a major contract.
In the United States, before a contract is awarded,
the prospective contractor must satisfy the Department of
Defense that it meets, or is able to meet, the criteria of
management control required. These criteria are stated in
DOD Instruction 7000.2 (Ref. 25) and are known as the Cost/
Schedule Control System Criteria (C/SCSC). There are thirty-
five of these criteria which are divided between organisation,
planning and budgeting, accounting, analysis, and revisions
and access to data. These criteria are amplified in the
C/SCSC Joint Implementation Guide (Ref. 26). The principle
is that- a contractor must be consistent in his method of
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managing; the total contract must be broken down into separate
units of work; the costs of labour, material and overhead must
be identifiable to each unit of work; both the estimate and
actual cost of work, must be summarised upward; differences
between planned and actual progress must be clearly presented;
and contract changes must be speedily and consistently
processed .
For a contractor's management system to be approved
there is a process of evaluation to be carried out. However,
once the system is approved, it is good for any further
contract subject to there having been no changes to the
system. The instrument that effects this is a Memorandum of
Understanding which is an agreement between the contractor
and the defence agency. In it, the latter approves of the
system while the former agrees not to make any changes without
approval .
In order to gain initial approval a contractor must
submit to a series of reviews. The initial one is the
Evaluation Review which is carried out before a contract is
awarded to evaluate how a contractor plans to comply with the
criteria. If awarded the contract, the contractor must then
submit to a series of reviews which leads up to the Demonstra-
tion Review. This review is presented by the contractor as
a demonstration that he is complying with the criteria. Once
accepted, there then continues a surveillance review during
the course of the contract to ensure that the management
system continues to meet the criteria.
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It is interesting to note that the SM-2 missile
contract with. General Dynamics is an exception to the rule
in that it does not comply with the criteria. It appears
that the requirement was waived by a senior Department of
Defense official, and it is presumed that the main reason was
because the SM-2 was a modification to the SM-1 , which had
been in development and production for some years. However,
it appears that General Dynamics will have to comply in the
near future if they wish to win further Navy and Army contracts
2 . The Development Plan
Whereas in the United States much work is carried
out in evaluating a contractor's management system, in Britain
the effort is put into producing a detailed development plan
for each contract. It appears that in the United States the
contractor, is normally left to devise more of the detail of
the plan such as work package size and schedule, and must only
seek approval from the project office of milestones and major
tasks .
In Britain, the Development Cost Plan is developed
during the two stages of Project Definition by the contractor
with assistance, and the approval, of the project office.
The plan is developed in two stages. At the end of PD1 the
plan should show the detail of tasks proposed for PD2 and a
broad appraisal of the work in full-scale development. This
should include an overall PERT/Time network. Also required
are cost estimates for the above activities and an estimate
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of unit production costs. Although these estimates are only
tentative and will be updated later, the contractor is
forced to start thinking about the units of work and related
costs at an early date.
By the end of PD2, the contractor must produce a
detailed management plan and Development Specifications. The
Development Specifications are broken down into: the
Performance Specification, which becomes part of the Naval
Staff Requirement; the Development Trials Specification, which
is used as the basis for acceptance into service; and the
Engineering Characteristics Specification. This last one
describes the hardware and is used for estimating production
costs. The management plan must show a break down of work
during full-scale development to the Work Package level. It
must include costs of labour and materials at this level,
with the schedule being shown by PERT/Time networks. The
requirement to produce such detailed planning information
was a result of investigations carried out for the Downey
Report (Ref. 5). Many contractors had stated that specifica-
tions had not been adequately defined prior to contract award.
This led to the inability to plan ahead and resulted in poor
costs and schedule estimates.
3 . The Work Breakdown Structure
This is a system whereby a complete project is
broken down through several stages into small units of work.
A typical example of part of a Work Breakdown Structure is
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shown in Figure 17. The problem is at what level should a
project office become involyed during routine monitoring?
In Britain, in the Handbook of Procedures (Ref. 20)
it is recommended th_at th_e regular monthly reports contain
detail at the Work. Package level (level 5). Further, it
recommends that the cost of a Work Package is between £ 1 ,000
and i50,000 and its duration should be not more than three
months. However, in the United States, the value of a Work
Package is not specifically stated and its duration is
recommended as not to exceed two reporting periods (approxi-
mately six months). This is because the Cost/Schedule
Control System Criteria does not require the project office
to become involved at this level and therefore it is of limited
concern to the project office how the contractor controls the
project at the Work Package level.
There is much discussion in Britain as to the size
of a Work Package and to the level of project office control.
Opinions were received from project managers in both industry
and the Ministry of Defence either from interviews or docu-
mented presentations and these showed that there was no
consensus on either side. It was generally considered that
the time level of three months was unrealistic and resulted
in hypothetical events. A more realistic time was between
six months and a year. A limit on the cost of a Work Package
was considered of lesser importance and varied between






















































the aim of a Work Package was to be of duration three months
and yal ue £10,000. This resulted in 55 major tasks and 1500
Work Packages.
A further point that came out was that in general,
industry considered that the project office should only look
at the Major Tasks (level 4) for routine monitoring, with
data on lower levels being available if required for closer
investigation.
4 . Monitoring
To monitor the progress of a project there must be
a focal point where all the information on each individual
task is gathered. To be of any use, it must then be clearly
presented in a manner that is readily understood by manage-
ment. In the cases where a PERT system is being used, the
schedule information can be presented in two reports, the
PERT Output-Float Order Report and the PERT Output-Completion
Date Report. The former shows the extra time available to
complete each unit of work in isolation. Units with no extra
time are on the critical path and those with negative quanti-
ties have slipped and unless corrective action is taken, the
project completion date will be delayed. The PERT Output-
Completion Date Report lists in order of expected completion
date the units of work. This then is a guide to management
as to which activities to obserye in the near future. The
unit of work that is reported is the element and in the case
of the Seawolf missile there were some 10,000 of them. To
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monitor all of these is not practicable and must at least be
delegated to the managers responsible for each Work Package.
In Britain reports are passed to the Ministry of Defence
project manager but it is considered unlikely that his per-
sonnel would have the time to study them thoroughly.
With the Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria of
the United States, a contractor collects similar information
as in Britain but only reports variances between Budgeted
Cost of Work Scheduled and Budgeted Cost of Work Performed.
The level at which these variances are reported depends on
their size. Individual large variances and an accumulation
of small ones must be reported.
For cost reports in the PERT system, three options
are given in the Handbook of Procedures (Ref. 20) for use in
Britain. The first is the 'rate of spend' comparison, which
compares actual costs to date with those budgeted to date.
The disadvantage in this method is that costs are not related
to actual work and therefore it may happen that costs are
being incurred at a budgeted rate but work accomplishment is
falling behind. In the case of the Seawolf missile, reports
in this format were requested by the Royal Aircraft
Establishment who were responsible for monitoring progress
during the early stages.
With the SM-2 missile, a report of equivalent men
employed at any one time is produced, an example of which is
shown in Figure 18. This is effectively the same as a rate
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The second method of cost reporting is the 'budget
cost comparison' method. This, compares the actual cost of
work performed with, the budgeted cost for that work. There-
fore it shows whether the work is costing too much or too
little, an over-run or an under-run. This method is required
by the Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria, and in a manner
similar to schedule analysis, only significant variances are
reported to the project office. For the Seawolf missile and
for the ship-borne tracking equipment, this was the method
used for continuous week by week monitoring. For the SM-2
missile, this method was also used and reported in the monthly
Cost Schedule Report.
The third method is the 're-estimate comparison' in
which the budgeted cost to completion is compared to the
re-estimated cost to completion. This method, although the
most informative, is also the most time-consuming if used for
weekly or monthly monitoring. However, updated estimates for
future work are requi red
5
though in practice these are done at
less frequent intervals, being between six weeks and three
months .
In the discussion so far, it has been assumed that
the performance achieved is as specified and that no change
to cost and schedule is considered for either over- or under-
achieving. This third factor to cost and schedule must
always be borne in mind, although to project managers in
industry or the defence agencies, changing this variable is
not normally within their authority. Improvement or
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relaxation of the specification are usually referred to the
central staffs for decision and approval of extra funds where
appropri ate
.
Finally, for a monitoring system to be effective,
the information that it gathers and processes must be pre-
sented without delay if corrective actions are to be taken
before too much harm is done. Therefore when monitoring the
cost and schedule of elements it is essential that the data
be presented to management within a few days of the end of
the period as the duration of an element is most likely to be
only measured in weeks. From discussions it appears that the
delay from the end of a period to the data being available is
about five days. As contractors increase their use of
computerised monitoring of work in progress, this delay should
be decreased which will benefit tighter management control.
5 . Suggested Improvements
From interviews with project managers and from
reading papers on managing defence con tracts , van' ous sugges-
tions for improvements have been made. However, all of these
suggestions concern how a summary of progress should be
displayed for use by defence agency personnel. This would
therefore imply that the present method is cumbersome for
senior management within the defence agencies.
One suggestion by a past project manager of Seawolf
is the use of a 'Status Index' (Ref. 19). This compares
work and costs in the formula:
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Work Planned Actual Cost
with all figures being related to the present period of time
A figure of greater than one means that value for money is
being gained and vice versa. This formula can be rearranged
to become
SI =
Estimated Cost of Work Budgeted Cost of Work
Achieved Performed
Actual Cost of Work
Achieved
BCWP
Actual Cost of Work
Performed
ACWP
Therefore this method presents a cost variance as a ratio
as opposed to a pound or dollar term used in C/SCSC. It is
suggested in Ref. 19 that the Status Index be evaluated for each
Work Package, but if this is done it is difficult to summarise
upwards. This is because Work Packages of differing values
or importance must not be allowed equal weighting. If
variances are expressed in pounds or dollars they can be
accurately summarised by simple addition.
Other suggestions include the expanded use of
graphical displays, the intention being to show the balance
between cost, schedule and performance. The problem here is
that it is difficult to display clearly a three-dimensional
plot and therefore one of the parameters has to be assumed as
constant. One such idea was presented at a PERT/Cost
Symposium in Britain (Ref. 27) in which the effects of
schedule variation were ignored. The representation was
called a 'Rainbow Chart" and an example is shown in Figure
19. The problem with this method is that it is difficult
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to quantify oyer- or under-achieyement of technical perform-
ance. Also by what criteria are the areas of good, bad and
value for money established. Another method variation is
described in a paper from the United States Defense Systems
Management School (Ref. 28). In thi s
,
performance is held
constant while the balance between cost and schedule is
displayed. Figure 20 shows an example. This graph would be
easy to plot as numerical values are known for cost and
schedule and would be a reasonably accurate representation of
the three parameters, as in most projects the performance is
virtually fixed.
Another graphical display suggested as a means of
monitoring the contractor's ability to keep to schedule is to
have a histogram of the number of Work Packages late by the
number of weeks. While this may be a good instrument for
displaying a contractor's inability to estimate schedule, it
has little bearing on the completion date of the project.
6 . Trade-Of f Deci si ons
One of the major responsibilities of a project
manager is to produce a plan for the project and then to
see it is carried out to the best of his ability. This
implies that when the project does not run according to cost
or schedule, the project manager must make trade-off decisions
between cost, schedule and performance. It can be said that
if one of these parameters changes for the worse it cannot be




















An exception to this rule is if there is an improvement in
efficiency, which, implies either that the project had
previously been run inefficiently, or that there is some
slack in the project that had not been initially reported.
During the course of interviews in Britain and the
United States, it became apparent that the importance of the
three parameters were treated differently. As a general
statement, in Britain it was apparent that the order of
importance for meeting the original requirement was: perform-
ance, schedule, then cost, while in the United States it was:
cost, then performance and schedule together. In Britain,
changes to the performance specification are unwelcome by the
project manager as they would often have to be approved by
the central staff and the users, thereby giving publicity to
the problems of the contract. If cost is allowed to increase,
the project manager has a 10% tolerance before he need report
it to the central staffs and also the cost problem need not
involve the users. Also, in these days of inflation, cost
escalation is not unusual.
In the United States, the life of a project is
controlled by whether Congress appropriates the necessary
funds. Therefore, if there are problems with a project,
having to go to Congress for more funds is avoided whenever
possible for fear of yery close scrutiny or even cancellation.
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C. THE BENEFITS AND CRITICISMS
When something is imposed on an individual or an
organisation and it is essentially against his wishes, any
favorable comments by that individual or organisation can
generally be trusted. In Britain and the United States,
industry was reluctant to adopt the Downey principles and
Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria respectively. Now that
both have been in operation for some years, many benefits have
been acknowledged as well as some criticisms.
The industries of the United States have acknowledged
that the main benefit that has been gained has been overall
system discipline. That is, industry has had to extend its
management by functional managers to cover the entire
project as controlled by the project manager. Other
benefits seen by industry have been: the costing of earned
value for work carried out in R&D contracts; detailed
forward planning; increased visibility and control; improved
communication, and increased cost/schedule awareness by
engineers (Ref. 29).
From the industries of both Britain and the United States
the major criticism is the level of detail of information
that the contractor is expected to collect and have available
to the project office. Another point that they criticise
although it is not to their own financial loss, is the cost
of implementing and running such a detailed system. From the
interviews, estimates of costs for management services varied





PERT/Cost is an extension of the PERT/Time system and
enables managers to cost the effects of accelerating a
project. To be able to do this, cost estimates for each
Work Package must be calculated for working at a normal rate,
and for working at an accelerated, or overtime, rate.
Estimates must also be produced of the cost of speeding up
deliveries and work from subcontractors. The object is to
calculate how much it would cost to reduce the duration of
a Work Package by a varying number of weeks. As contractors
have difficulty in estimating costs at a normal rate and
complain of the work load in doing it, they are certainly not
enthusiastic at doing it several times for different degrees
of acceleration.
Having calculated the costs of acceleration for each
Work Package, the theory of PERT/Cost says that the cheapest
way of accelerating the whole project is then calculated.
This is done for different quantities of acceleration by
accelerating those Work Packages that are the cheapest in
terms of money for project weeks saved. The object here is
that if a project manager wishes to accelerate the project,
or more likely to regain some slippage of schedule, the
cheapest way of doing it is presented to him from PERT/Cost
data. Therefore if a project schedule has slipped the
manager may decide to accelerate some Work Packages later on
in the programme. However, in real life, it would be a
brave project manager who, on finding that the schedule has
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slipped, would defer recovery action until a time that might
be towards the end of a project. This then is one problem in
the use of PERT/Cost, and while project managers are human
this problem will not be overcome.
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VII . SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
This Chapter presents in summary form the differences
found during this investigation.
As a general statement, it can be said the process
of major system acquisition, or procurement, and the method
of control exercised by the respective defence agency on
a contractor are similar. However, there are differences,
some of which can be explained by the different character-
istics of the countries and some by the fact that there
are two equally good ways of operating. On the other hand,
there are some differences which, in the opinion of the
author, it would be beneficial for one country to heed
from the other. These latter differences are described
at the end of this Chapter.
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
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B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . OMB Circular A- 109 (U.S.
)
The recent introduction of OMB Circular A-109
has correctly emphasised that a need should be firmly
established at the beginning of the acquisition process.
The introduction of the Mission Element Need Statement
brings the U.S. process more in line with that practised
in Britain where a Naval Staff Target has been required
for several years. However, full implementation of OMB
Circular A-109 by U.S. agencies is still in process, and
until it is completed and experience gained from its use,




A user-oriented Mission Element Need Statement
is required, whereas previously the operational require-
ment had been heavily influenced by the technological
input.
In order to maintain a balance between the user
needs and the technology base, represented by Navy
laboratories and industry, it is recommended that a user/
producer dialogue be actively encouraged during the




The short-term disadvantages of adverse balance
of payments and trading of technological superiority will be
surpassed by the long-term advantages of a continuing arms
market and of the sharing of development costs.
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It is recommended that co-development projects with
NATO and other countries should be further encouraged.
4. PERT/COST (UK)
The ability and willingness of contractors to
estimate accelerated schedules for Work Packages is poor
and the time and money involved in running the system
would be great. Also, even if PERT/Cost information was
available, managers would be reluctant to see slippages
remain unchecked while waiting for the 'least costly'
period to rectify them.
It is recommended that PERT/Cost not be implemented
as a contractor's management system.
5. Work Packages (UK)
In the guide-lines on the use of the PERT/Time
system, the recommended value and duration of a Work
Package is too small so that some are divided up to create
hypothetical events.
It is recommended that more flexibility be en-
couraged so that although many Work Packages will still
be approximately £] 0, 000 and of duration three months,




It is considered that the volume of cost and
schedule reports supplied to the project office in




It is recommended that more emphasis should be
placed on summaries that highlight the critical problem
areas through use of cost and schedule variance analysis.
This would be more in line with the United States Cost/
Schedule Control System Criteria.
7. Status Index (UK)
The usefulness of a Status Index to express the
cost performance of each Work Package is limited due to
the difficulty of summarising them upwards to produce
an overall Status Index.
It is recommended that it is preferrable to
express cost performance in monetary terms.
8. Project Control (UK)
Contractors are not given, or do not take, suf-
ficient responsibility for controlling a project, but
instead carry out the directives of the project offices.
This situation also exists in the United States to some
extent. The problem is that the project office becomes
too involved in the day-to-day running of the contractor's
business.
It is recommended that contractors be given
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